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Abstract
We propose a new framework to value employee stock options (ESOs) that captures
multiple exercises of different quantities over time. We also model the ESO holder’s job
termination risk and incorporate its impact on the payoffs of both vested and unvested
ESOs. Numerical methods based on Fourier transform and finite differences are developed
and implemented to solve the associated systems of PDEs. In addition, we introduce a new
valuation method based on maturity randomization that yields analytic formulae for vested
and unvested ESO costs. We examine the cost impact of job termination risk, exercise
intensity, and various contractual features.
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1 Introduction
The use of employee stock options (ESOs) as part of compensation is a common practice among
large and small companies in the United States. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
requires companies to value these stock options and report the total granting cost.1 This re-
quirement raises the need for valuation methods that can effectively capture the payoff structure
and exercise pattern of these stock options.
Empirical studies suggest that ESO holders tend to start exercising their options exercise
early, often soon after the vesting period, and gradually exercise the remaining options over
multiple dates before maturity. Huddart and Lang (1996), Marquardt (2002), and Bettis et al.
(2005) point out that, for ESOs with 10 years to maturity, the expected time to exercise is 4 to
5 years. Investigating how ESO exercises are spread out over time, Huddart and Lang (1996)
show that the mean fraction of options exercised by a typical employee at one time varied from
0.18 to 0.72. For more empirial studies, we refer to Huddart and Lang (1996), Bettis et al.
(2001), Marquardt (2002), Armstrong et al. (2007), Hallock and Olson (2007), Heron and Lie
(2016) and Carpenter et al. (2017). These empirical findings motivate us to consider a valuation
model that account for multiple exercises of various units of options at different times. As noted
by Jain and Subramanian (2004), “the incorporation of multiple-date exercise has important
economic and account consequences.”
In this paper, we take the firm’s perspective to determine the cost of an ESO grant. An
ESO grant commonly involves multiple options with a long maturity. There is also a vesting
period, during which option exercise is prohibited and job termination leads to forfeiture of the
options. The key component of our proposed valuation framework is an exogenous jump process
that models the random exercises over time. Within our framework, the employee’s exercise
intensity can be constant or stochastic, and the number of options exercised at each time can
be specified to be deterministic or random. In essence, this top-down approach offers a flexible
setup to model any exercise pattern. The idea is akin to the top-down approach in credit risk
(Giesecke and Goldberg (2011)), where the exogenous jump process represents portfolio losses.
Since the ESO payoff depends heavily on when the employee leaves the firm, we also include a
random job termination time and allow the job termination rate to be different during and after
vesting period.
The valuation problem leads to the study of the system of partial differential equations
(PDEs) associated with the vested and unvested options. In order to compute the ESO costs,
we present two numerical methods to solve the PDEs. We discuss the method of fast Fourier
transform (FFT), followed by the finite difference method (FDM). By applying Fourier trans-
form, we simplify the original second-order PDEs to ODEs in the constant intensity case and
first-order PDEs in the stochastic intensity case. The ESO costs are recovered via inverse fast
Fourier transform. The results from the two methods are illustrated and compared under both
deterministic and stochastic exercise intensities. Furthermore, we introduce a new valuation
method based on maturity randomization. The key advantage of this method is that it yields
analytic formulae, allowing for instant computation.
Using all three numerical methods, we compute the costs and examine the impact of job
termination risk, exercise intensity, vesting period, and other features. Among our findings,
we illustrate the distributions of exercise times under different model specifications, and also
1See FASB Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) no.718 (formerly, FASB Statement 123R), Accounting
for Stock-Based Compensation.
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show that the average time of exercises tends to increase nonlinearly with the number of ESOs
granted, resulting in a higher per-unit cost. In other words, under the assumption that the ESOs
will be exercised gradually, a larger ESO grant has an indirect effect of delaying exercises, and
thus leading to higher ESO costs.
In the literature, there are three main approaches for risk-neutral valuation and expensing
of ESOs. Models are often be differentiated by their assumptions on exercise timing. One
approach is to pre-specify an exercise boundary that determines the employee’s exercise strategy
of a single ESO. In turn, the ESO is then priced as an option of barrier type (Hull and White
(2004); Cvitanic´ et al. (2008)). The boundary is typically chosen to be explicit and simple for
the ease of computation but does not come with empirical or behavioral justification.
Another approach is to an optimal exercise time that maximizes the expected discounted
payoff under some risk-neutral pricing measure (Leung and Wan (2015)). Instead of the risk
neutrality assumption, a number of related studies incorporate the employee’s risk prefer-
ences and hedging constraints and derive the optimal exercise strategy by solving a utility
maximization problem. For this line of research, we refer to Jain and Subramanian (2004);
Grasselli and Henderson (2009); Leung and Sircar (2009a,b), and Carmona et al. (2011). In
particular, Jain and Subramanian (2004) and Leung and Sircar (2009a), respectively, propose
discrete-time and continuous-time models that allow the risk-averse employee to strategically
exercise the ESOs over time rather than all on the same date. In addition to accounting for
multiple-date exercises, Grasselli and Henderson (2009) also show that a risk-averse employee
may find it optimal to exercise multiple options simultaneously at different exercise times.
In reality, firms do not know when ESOs will be exercised. Therefore, it is reasonable to
model ESO exercises as some exogenous events so that the firm is not assumed to have access
to the employee’s risk preferences and exercise strategy. This leads to the approach, as studied
by Jennergren and Naslund (1993); Carr and Linetsky (2000) among others, that models ESO
exercise by the first arrival time of an exogenous jump process. Although the exercises are
exogenous events, the frequency and timing of their exercises can be dependent on the firm’s
stock and other contractural features. Our proposed approach is essentially an extension of this
approach to modeling multiple ESO exercises over the life of the options.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our ESO valuation
model. The numerical method is discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the case with
stochastic exercise intensity. Then in Section 5 we introduce a novel valuation method based on
maturity randomization. Finally, concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
2 ESO Valuation Model
We begin by describing the ESO payoff structure, and then introduce the stochastic model that
captures various sources of randomness. The valuation of both vested and unvested ESOs is
presented.
3
2.1 Payoff Structure
The ESO is an early exercisable call option written on the company stock with a long maturity
T ranging from 5 to 10 years. In order to maintain the incentive effect of ESOs, the company
typically prohibits the ESO holder (employee) from exercising during a vesting period from the
grant date. During the vesting period, which ranges from 1 to 5 years, the holder’s departure
from the company, voluntarily or forced, will lead to forfeiture of the option, rending it worth-
less. We denote [0, tv) as the vesting period, and after the date tv the ESO is vested and free to
be exercised until it expires at time T . The ESO payoff at any time τ is (Sτ −K)
+1{tv≤τ≤T},
where Sτ is the firm’s stock price at time τ and K is the strike price. Upon departure, the em-
ployee is supposed to exercise all the remaining options. Figure 1 shows all four payoff scenarios
associated with an ESO.
( 1) tv ( 2) ( 3) T
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S0
St
oc
k 
Pr
ice
0
S ( 2)-K
ST( 4)-K
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Figure 1: ESO payoff structure. From bottom path to top path: (i) The employee leaves the firm
during the vesting period, resulting in forfeiture of the ESO and a zero payoff. (ii) The employee
exercises the vested ESO before maturity due to desire to liquidate or job termination and receive
the payoff (Sτ (ω2) −K)
+. (iii) The employee exercises the vested ESO before maturity due to
job termination, but receives nothing. (iv) The employee exercises the option at maturity T .
2.2 Job Termination and Exercise Process
The employee’s job termination plays a crucial role in the exercise timing and resulting payoff
of the ESOs. We model the job termination time during the vesting period by an exponential
random variable ζ ∼ exp(α), with α ≥ 0. When the ESO becomes vested after tv, we model
the employee’s job termination time by another exponential random variable ξ ∼ exp(β), with
β ≥ 0. We assume that ζ and ξ are mutually independent. This approach of modeling job
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termination by an exogenous random variable is also used by Jennergren and Naslund (1993),
Carpenter (1998), Carr and Linetsky (2000), Hull and White (2004), Sircar and Xiong (2007),
Leung and Sircar (2009b), Carmona et al. (2011), and Leung and Wan (2015), among others.
In our model, using two different exponential times allows us to account for the varying level of
job termination risk during and after the vesting period.
An ESO grant typically contains multiple options. Empirical studies show that employee
tends to exercise the options gradually over time, rather than exercising all options at once.
This motivates us to model the sequential random timing of exercises. In our proposed model,
we consider a grant of M units of identical early exercisable ESOs with the same strike price K
and expiration date T . These M ESOs are exercisable only after the vesting period [0, tv). For
the vested ESOs, we define the random exercise process Lt, for tv ≤ t ≤ T , to be the positive
jump process representing the number of ESOs exercised over time. As such, Lt is an integer
process that takes value on [0,M ]. The corresponding jump times are denoted by the sequence
(τ1, τ2, . . .), and the frequency of exercises is governed by the jump intensity process (λt)tv≤t≤T .
The jump size for the ith jump of L represents the number of ESOs exercised and is described
by a discrete random variable δi. The exercise process starts at time tv with Ltv = 0. By
definition, we have LT ≤ M . This means that the random jump size at any time t must take
value within [1,M−Lt−]. Also, as soon as Lt reaches the upper boundM , the jump intensity λt
must be set to be zero thereafter. Given that the employee still holds m options, the probability
mass function of the random jump size is
pm,z , P{δi = z|Lτi− =M −m} . (1)
In turn, the expected number of options to be exercised at each exercise time is given by
p¯m ,
m∑
z=1
zpm,z, (2)
which again depends on the current number of ESOs held.
The employee may exercise single or multiple units of ESOs over time. On the date of
expiration or job termination, any unexercised options must be exercised. Hence, the discounted
payoff from the ESOs over [0, T ] is a sum of two terms, given by(∫ T∧ξ
tv
e−rt(St −K)
+dLt + e
−r(T∧ξ)(M − LT∧ξ)(ST∧ξ −K)
+
)
1{ζ≥tv}. (3)
The indicator 1{ζ≥tv} means that the ESO payoff is zero if the employee leaves the firm during
the vesting period.
Example 1 (Unit Exercises) Suppose Lt be a nonhomogeneous Poisson process (Nt)0≤t≤T
with a time-varying jump intensity function λ(t), for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . At each jump time a single
option is exercised. In Figure 2 we illustrate three possible scenarios. In scenario (i), the
employee exercises 6 out of 10 options one by one, but must exercise 4 remaining options upon
job termination realized at time ξ(ω1). In scenario (ii) the employee exercises all 10 options
one by one before maturity. In scenario (iii), the employee has not exercised all the options by
maturity, so all remaining options are exercised at time T .
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Figure 2: Three illustrative sample paths of the process for Poisson exercises of 10 ESOs. From
path top to bottom path: (i) The employee first exercises 6 out of 10 options one by one, but
is then forced to exercise 4 remaining options upon job termination realized at time ξ(ω1). (ii)
The employee exercises all the options one by one before expiration and job termination. The
last option is exercised at τ(ω2) shown in the plot. (iii) The employee exercises 3 options one
by one before maturity and 7 remaining options at maturity.
Example 2 (Block Exercises) Suppose the employee can exercise one or more options at each
exercise time. As an example, We assume a uniform distribution for the number of options to
be exercised, so we set pm,z = m
−1 for z = 1, . . . ,m. In Figure 3, we illustrate the distributions
of the weighted average exercise time τ¯ defined by
τ¯ =
∑N
i=1 δi ∗ τi
M
, (4)
where δi is the number of ESOs exercised at the ith exercise time τi, and N is the number of
distinct exercise times before or at time T . For each simulated path, we take an average of the
distinct exercise times weighted by the number of options exercised at each time. With common
parameters M = 20, tv = 0, T = 10, the histograms of τ¯ correspond to different values of λ and β.
With a low job termination rate β and low exercise intensity λ (panel (a) where β = 0, λ = 0.3),
more options tend to be exercised at maturity. Comparing panel (b) to panel (c), and also panel
(b) to panel (d), we see that a higher job termination rate or higher exercise intensity lowers the
average exercise time and reduces instances of exercising at maturity. Similar patterns can also
be found in empirical studies (Heron and Lie, 2016, Fig. 3).
6
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3: Histograms of weighted average exercise times, as defined in (4), based on 10,000
simulated exercise processes for 20 vested ESOs with a 10-year maturity. Panels have different
rates of job termination β and exercise intensity λ. (a): β = 0, λ = 0.3; (b): β = 0.1, λ = 0.3;
(c): β = 0.3, λ = 0.3; (d): β = 0.1, λ = 0.5.
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2.3 PDEs for ESO Valuation
To value ESOs, we consider a risk-neutral pricing measure Q for all stochastic processes and
random variables in our model. We model the firm’s stock price process (St)t≥0 by a geometric
Brownian motion
dSt = (r − q)St dt+ σSt dWt, (5)
where the positive constants r, q and σ are the interest rate, dividend rate, and volatility
parameter respectively, and W is a standard Brownian motion under Q, independent of the
exponentially-distributed job termination times ζ and ξ. Our default assumption for the em-
ployee’s exercise intensity is that it is a deterministic function of time, denoted by λ(t). We will
discuss the case with a stochastic exercise intensity in Section 4.
At any time t ∈ [tv, T ], the ESO is vested. The vested ESO cost functions C
(m)(t, s), for
m = 1, 2, . . . ,M , where m is the number of options currently held, are given by the risk-neutral
expectation of discounted future ESO payoffs provided that the employee has not left the firm.
C(m)(t, s) =IE
{∫ T∧ξ
t
e−r(u−t)(Su −K)
+dLu
+ e−r(T∧ξ−t)(M − LT∧ξ)(ST∧ξ −K)
+ |St = s, Lt =M −m
}
=IE
{∫ T
t
e−(r+β)(u−t)(Su −K)
+dLu + e
−(r+β)(T−t)(M − LT )(ST −K)
+
+
∫ T
t
βe−(r+β)(v−t)(M − Lv)(Sv −K)
+dv |St = s, Lt =M −m
}
, (6)
for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M , and (t, s) ∈ [tv, T ]×R+.
Next, we define the infinitesimal generator associated with the stock price process S by
L · = (r − q)s∂s · +
σ2s2
2
∂ss · . (7)
We determine the vested ESO costs by solving the following system of PDEs.
−(r + λ(t) + β)C(m) + C
(m)
t + LC
(m) + λ(t)
m−1∑
z=1
pm,zC
(m−z) + (λ(t)p¯m +mβ) (s−K)
+ = 0,
(8)
for (t, s) ∈ [tv, T ]×R+ andm = 1, 2, . . . ,M . Here, p¯m is the expected number of options exercised
and pm,z is the probability of exercising z options with m options left. The terminal condition
is C(m)(T, s) = m(s−K)+ for s ∈ R+.
During the vesting period [0, tv), the ESO is unvested and is subject to forfeiture if the
employee leaves the firm. We denote the cost of m units of unvested ESO by C˜(m)(t, s). Since
holding an unvested ESO effectively entitles the holder to obtain a vested ESO at time tv
provided the holder is still with the firm. If the ESO holder leaves the firm at any time t ∈ [0, tv),
the unvested ESO cost is zero. Otherwise, given that ζ > t, the (pre-departure) unvested ESO
cost is
C˜(m)(t, s) = IE
{
e−r(tv−t)C(m)(tv, Stv )1{ζ≥tv}|St = s
}
= IE
{
e−(r+α)(tv−t)C(m)(tv, Stv )|St = s
}
. (9)
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To determine the unvested ESO cost, we solve the PDE problem
−(r + α)C˜(m) + C˜
(m)
t + LC˜
(m) = 0, for (t, s) ∈ [0, tv)×R+,
C˜(m)(tv, s) = C
(m)(tv, s), for s ∈ R
+.
(10)
Here, C(m)(tv, s) is the vested ESO cost evaluated at time tv.
3 Numerical Methods and Implementation
In this section, we present two numerical methods to solve PDE (8). We first discuss the
application of fast Fourier transform (FFT) to ESO valuation, followed by the finite difference
method (FDM). The results from the two methods are compared in Section 3.3.
3.1 Fast Fourier Transform
We first consider the vested ESO (t ∈ [tv, T ]). Let x such that s = Ke
x, and define the function
f (m)(t, x) = C(m)(t,Kex), (t, x) ∈ [tv, T ]× R, (11)
for each m = 1, . . . ,M . The PDE for f (m)(t, x) is given by
−(r+λ(t)+β)f (m)+f
(m)
t +L˜f
(m)+λ(t)
m−1∑
z=1
pm,zf
(m−z)+(λ(t)p¯m +mβ) (Ke
x−K)+ = 0, (12)
where
L˜ · = (r − q −
σ2
2
)∂x ·+
σ2
2
∂xx · . (13)
The terminal condition is f (m)(T, x) = m(Kex −K)+, for x ∈ R.
The Fourier transform of f (m)(t, x) is defined by
F [f (m)](t, ω) =
∫ ∞
−∞
f (m)(t, x)e−iωxdx, (14)
for m = 1, . . . ,M , with angular frequency ω in radians per second. Applying Fourier transform
to PDE (12), we obtain an ODE for F [f (m)](t, ω), a function of time t parametrized by ω, for
each m = 1, . . . ,M . Precisely, we have
d
dt
F [f (m)](t, ω) = h(t, ω)F [f (m)](t, ω) + ψ(m)(t, ω), (15)
where
h(t, ω) = r + λ(t) + β − iω(r − q −
σ2
2
) + ω2
σ2
2
, (16)
ψ(m)(t, ω) = −λ(t)
m−1∑
z=1
pm,zF [f
(m−z)](t, ω)− (λ(t)p¯m +mβ)ϕ(ω), (17)
ϕ(ω) = F [(Kex −K)+](ω), (18)
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with the terminal condition F [f (m)](T, ω) = mϕ(ω). Solving the ODE, we obtain
F [f (m)](t, ω) = e−
∫
T
t
h(s,ω)dsF [f (m)](T, ω)−
∫ T
t
e−
∫
u
t
h(s,ω)dsψ(m)(u, ω)du. (19)
Accordingly, we can recover the vested ESO cost function by inverse Fourier transform:
f (m)(t, x) = F−1[F [f (m)]](t, x). (20)
for every m = 1, . . . ,M , and (t, x) ∈ (tv, T )× R.
In the literature, Leung and Wan (2015) apply a Fourier time-stepping (FST) method it
to compute the cost of an American-style ESO when the company stock is driven by a Levy
process. This FST method has been applied more broadly by Jackson et al. (2008) to solve
partial-integro differential equations (PIDEs) that arise in options pricing problems.
Remark 3 If λ is a constant, then the Fourier transform in (19) can be simplified as
F [f (m)](t, ω) =
m−1∑
k=0
F
(m)
k (ω)(T − t)
ke−(T−t)h(ω) + F (m)(ω), (21)
where
F (m)(ω) =
1
h(ω)
(
λ
m−1∑
z=1
pm,zF
(m−z)(ω) + (λp¯m +mβ)ϕ(ω)
)
, (22)
F
(m)
k (ω) =
λ
k
m−k∑
z=1
pm,zF
(m−z)
k−1 (ω), k = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1, (23)
F
(m)
0 (ω) = F [f
(m)](T, ω)−
1
h(ω)
(
λ
m−1∑
z=1
pm,zF
(m−z)(ω) + (λp¯m +mβ)ϕ(ω)
)
, (24)
h(ω) = r + λ+ β − iω(r − q −
σ2
2
) + ω2
σ2
2
. (25)
In (22) and (24), ϕ(ω) is defined in (18).
For numerical implementation, we work with a finite domain [tv, T ] × [xmin, xmax] with
uniform discretization of lengths δt = (T − tv)/Nt and δx = (xmax − xmin)/(Nx − 1) in the
time-space dimensions. We set δt = 0.01, xmin = −10, xmax = 10 and Nx = 2
12. Similarly,
we discrete the finite frequency space [ωmin, ωmax] with uniform grid size of δω, where we apply
the Nyquist critical frequency that ωmax = pi/δx and δω = 2ωmax/Nx. For j = 0, . . . , Nt, and
k = 0, . . . , Nx − 1, we denote tj = tv + jδt, xk = xmin + kδx, and
ωk =
{
kδω, 0 ≤ k ≤ Nx/2 ,
kδω − 2ωmax, Nx/2 + 1 ≤ k ≤ Nx − 1] .
(26)
Then we numerically compute the discrete Fourier transform
F [f ](tj , ωk) ≈
Nx−1∑
n=0
f(tj, xn)e
−iωkxnδx = φk
Nx−1∑
n=0
f(tj, xn)e
−i2pikn/Nx , (27)
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with φk = e
−iωkxminδx. In (27), we evaluate the sum
∑Nx−1
n=0 f(tj, xn)e
−i2pikn/Nx by applying
the standard fast Fourier transform (FFT) algorithm. The corresponding Fourier inversion is
conducted by inverse FFT, yielding the vested ESO cost f(tj, xn). Note that the coefficient φk
will be cancelled in the process.
As for the unvested ESO, we define the associated cost function
f˜ (m)(t, x) = C˜(m)(t,Kex), (28)
for each m = 1, . . . ,M . From PDE (10), we derive the PDE for f˜ (m)(t, x)
− (r + α)f˜ (m) + f˜
(m)
t + L˜f˜
(m) = 0, (29)
for (t, x) ∈ [0, tv) × R, with the terminal condition f˜
(m)(tv, x) = f
(m)(tv , x), for x ∈ R. As we
can see, once the vested ESO cost is computed, it determines the terminal condition for the
unvested ESO problem.
Applying Fourier transform to (29), we can derive the ODE for F [f˜ (m)](t, ω),
d
dt
F [f˜ (m)](t, ω) = h˜(ω)F [f˜ (m)](t, ω), (30)
where
h˜(ω) = r + α− iω(r − q −
σ2
2
) + ω2
σ2
2
, (31)
for (t, ω) ∈ [0, tv)×R, with the terminal condition F [f˜
(m)](tv , ω) = F [f
(m)](tv, ω). We solve the
ODE to get
F [f˜ (m)](t, ω) = e−h˜(ω)(tv−t)F [f˜ (m)](tv , ω). (32)
In turn, we apply inverse Fourier transform to recover the unvested ESO cost:
C˜(m)(t,Kex) = f˜ (m)(t, x) = F−1[F [f˜ (m)]](t, x), (33)
for (t, x) ∈ [0, tv)×R. Again, we apply FFT to numerically compute the Fourier transform and
use inverse FFT to recover the cost function.
3.2 Finite Difference Method
For comparison, we also compute the ESO costs using a finite difference method. Specifically,
we apply the Crank-Nicolson method on a uniform grid. Here we provide an outline with focus
on the boundary conditions for our application. For more details, we refer to Wilmott et al.
(1995), among other references.
As for grid settings, We restrict the domain [tv, T ]× R+ to a finite domain D = {(t, s)|tv ≤
t ≤ T, 0 ≤ s ≤ S∗}, where S∗ must be relatively very large such that if the current stock
price St = S∗, then the stock price will be larger than the strike price K over [t, T ] with great
probability.
To determine the boundary condition at s = S∗, we introduce a new function
C¯(m)(t, s) = IE
{∫ T
t
e−(r+β)(u−t)(Su −K)dLu + e
−(r+β)(T−t)(M − LT )(ST −K)
+
∫ T
t
βe−(r+β)(v−t)(M − Lv)(Sv −K)dv |St = s, Lt =M −m
}
.
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for m = 1, . . . ,M . When s = S∗, we see that C
(m)(t, s) ≈ C¯(m)(t, s). Thus, we can set the
boundary condition at s = S∗ to be C
(m)(t, S∗) = C¯
(m)(t, S∗). By Feynman-Kac formula,
C¯(m)(t, s) satisfies the PDE
− (r+λ(t)+β)C¯(m)+ C¯
(m)
t +LC¯
(m)+λ(t)
m−1∑
z=1
pm,zC¯
(m−z)+(λ(t)p¯m +mβ) (s−K) = 0, (34)
for m = 1, . . . ,M , and (t, s) ∈ (tv, T )×R+, with terminal condition C¯
(m)(T, s) = m(s−K), for
s ∈ R+. Then, C¯
(m)(t, s) has the ansatz solution
C¯(m)(t, s) = Am(t)s−Bm(t)K, (35)
where Am(t) and Bm(t) satisfy the pair of ODEs respectively,
−(q + λ(t) + β)Am +A
′
m + λ(t)
m−1∑
z=1
pm,zAm−z + (λ(t)p¯m +mβ) = 0,
−(r + λ(t) + β)Bm +B
′
m + λ(t)
m−1∑
z=1
pm,zBm−z + (λ(t)p¯m +mβ) = 0,
(36)
for m = 1, . . . ,M , and t ∈ (tv, T ), with the terminal condition Bm(T ) = Am(T ) = m, for
m = 1, . . . ,M . We can solve the ODEs (36) analytically, or numerically solve it using the
backward Euler method.
Next, we discrete the domain D with uniform grid size of δt = (T − tv)/M0 and δS = S∗/N0.
Then, we apply C
(m)
i,j to denote discrete approximations of C
(m)(ti, sj) where ti = tv + iδt and
sj = jδS. The Crank-Nicolson method is applied to solve the PDEs satisfied by C
(m), for m =
1, . . . ,M . Working backward in time, we obtain the vested ESO costs at time tv, which become
the terminal condition values for the unvested ESO valuation problem. For the unvested ESO
cost, we restrict the domain [0, tv ]×R+ to the finite domain D˜ = {(t, s)|0 ≤ t ≤ tv, 0 ≤ s ≤ S∗},
where S∗ is relatively very large such that
C˜(m)(t, S∗) = IE
{
e−(r+α)(tv−t)C(m)(tv, Stv )|St = S∗
}
(37)
≈ IE
{
e−(r+α)(tv−t)(Am(T − tv)Stv −Bm(T − tv)K)|St = S∗
}
(38)
= e−(q+α)(tv−t)Am(T − tv)S∗ − e
−(r+α)(tv−t)Bm(T − tv)K. (39)
We again apply the Crank-Nicolson method solve the PDEs satisfied by C˜(m)(t, s), for m =
1, . . . ,M .
3.3 Numerical Examples
Using both FFT and FDM we compute different ESO costs by varying the vesting period tv,
job termination rate α and β, as well as exercise intensity λ. In Table 1, we present the ESO
costs and compare the two numerical methods. It is well known that the call option value is
increasing with respect to its maturity. In a similar spirit if the employee tends to exercise the
ESO earlier, then a smaller ESO cost is expected. As we can see in Table 1, the ESO cost
decreases as exercise intensity λ increases, or as job termination rate α or β increases, holding
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other things constant. On the other hand, the effect of vesting period is not monotone. In a
scenario with a high job termination α during the vesting period, the employee is very likely
to leave the firm while the options are unvested, leading to a zero payoff. Consequently, the
ESO cost is decreasing with respect to tv. This corresponds to the case with α = 1 in Table 1.
However, if α is small, then the employee is unlikely to leave the firm and lose the options during
the vesting period. Therefore, a longer vesting period would effectively make the employee hold
the options for a longer period of time, delaying the exercise. As a result, the ESO cost is
increasing with respect to tv, which is shown in other cases in Table 1.
Parameters
tv = 0 tv = 2 tv = 4
FDM FFT FDM FFT FDM FFT
α = 0.1, β = 0
λ = 1 5.4729 5.4753 7.8399 7.8405 8.2845 8.2849
λ = 2 3.7067 3.7101 6.9164 6.9170 7.7054 7.7058
α = 0.1, β = 1
λ = 1 3.2483 3.2522 6.7063 6.7069 7.5746 7.5750
λ = 2 2.7024 2.7069 6.4655 6.4661 7.4253 7.4257
α = 0, β = 0.1
λ = 1 5.0603 5.0629 9.3022 9.3031 12.1510 12.1517
λ = 2 3.5595 3.5630 8.3622 8.3631 11.4298 11.4306
α = 1, β = 0.1
λ = 1 5.0603 5.0629 1.2579 1.2590 0.2219 0.2226
λ = 2 3.5595 3.5630 1.1310 1.1318 0.2087 0.2094
Table 1: Vested and unvested ESO costs under different exercise intensities λ and different
job termination rates α and β, computed using FFT and FDM for comparison. Common
Parameters: S0 = K = 10, r = 5%, q = 1.5%, σ = 20%, pm,z = 1/m, M = 5 and T = 10. In
FDM: S∗ = 30, δS = 0.1, δt = 0.1. In FFT: Nx = 2
12, xmin = −10 and xmax = 10.
In Figure 4, we plot the ESO cost as a function of the exercise intensity λ for T = 5, 8 and
10. It shows that the ESO is decreasing and convex with respect to λ. An employee with a high
exercise intensity tends to exercise the ESOs earlier than those with a lower exercise intensity.
Since the call option value increases with maturity, exercising the ESO earlier will result in a
lower cost. As the exercise intensity increases from zero, the ESO cost tends to decrease faster
than when the exercise intensity is higher. Moreover, Figure 4 also shows that as λ increases,
the ESO costs associated with different maturities T = 5, 8 and 10 get close to each other. The
intuition is that when λ is large, the options will be exercised very early and the maturity will
not have a significant impact on the option values.
On the right panel of Figure 4, we plot the option value as a function of stock price S0 with
exercise intensity λ = 0, 1 or 5. It shows that, as λ increases from 0 to 1, the option value
decreases rapidly. When the exercise intensity is very high, i.e. λ = 5 in the figure, there is a
high chance of immediate exercise, so the ESO value is seen to be very close to the ESO payoff
(S0 −K)
+.
Next, we consider the effect of the total number of ESOs granted. Intuitively we expect the
total cost to increase as the number of options M increases, but the effect is far from linear. In
Figure 5 we see that the average per-unit cost and average time to exercise are increasing as
M increases. In other words, under the assumption that the ESOs will be exercised gradually,
a larger ESO grant has an indirect effect of delaying exercises, and thus leading to higher ESO
costs. The increasing trends hold for different exercise intensities, but the rate of increase
diminishes significantly for large M . Also, the higher the exercise intensity, the lower the per-
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unit cost and shorter averaged time to exercise.
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Figure 4: Left: ESO cost as a function of employee exercise intensity λ when the maturity
T = 5, 8 or 10. Right: ESO cost as a function of initial stock price S0 with λ = 0, 1, or 5.
Parameters: K = 10, r = 5%, q = 1.5%, σ = 20%, pm,z = 1/m, M = 5, T = 10, tv = 0 and
β = 0.1. In FFT: Nx = 2
12, xmin = −10, xmax = 10.
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Figure 5: Left: Per-unit ESO cost as a function of number of options granted M with different
exercise intensities λ. Right: With M = 20 options under different exercise intensities λ, we
calculate the average exercise times by Monte-Carlo simulation with 108 simulated paths of
exercise process. Common parameters: S0 = K = 10, r = 5%, q = 1.5%, σ = 20%, pm,z = 1/m,
T = 10, tv = 1, β = 0.5 and α = 0.1. In FFT: Nx = 2
12, xmin = −10, xmax = 10.
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4 Stochastic Exercise Intensity
Now we discuss the stochastic exercise intensity, an extension to the previous model, that λt =
λ(t, St), which is the function not only depends on the time t also depends on the stock price
St. Accordingly, the corresponding vested ESO cost C
(m)(t, s) will satisfy
−(r + λ(t, s) + β)C(m) +C
(m)
t + LC
(m) + λ(t, s)
m−1∑
z=1
pm,zC
(m−z)
+(λ(t, s)p¯m +mβ) (s−K)
+ = 0,
(40)
for m = 1, . . . ,M , and (t, s) ∈ [tv, T ] × R+, with terminal condition C
(m)(T, s) = m(s − K)+,
for s ∈ R+.
Since we only discuss the stochastic exercise intensity and the employee will not exercise the
option during the vesting period, the PDE for unvested ESO will remain unchanged. Next, we
will discuss how to numerically solve (40) by FFT.
For applying Fourier transform, we use the same notation as in Section 3.1 that
f (m)(t, x) = C(m)(t,Kex), (41)
for m = 1, . . . ,M , (t, x) ∈ [tv, T ]× R, and
F [f (m)](t, ω) =
∫ ∞
−∞
f (m)(t, x)e−iωxdx, (42)
for m = 1, . . . ,M . In this section, we assume that λ(t, x) = A(t) − B(t)x, for some positive
time-dependent functions A(t) and B(t). For implementation, we assume B(t) be relative small,
such that λ(t, x) stay positive in the truncated space (tv, T ) × [−xmax, xmax]. Then, f
(m)(t, x)
satisfies
−(r +A(t)−B(t)x+ β)f (m) + f
(m)
t + L˜f
(m) + (A(t)−B(t)x)
m−1∑
z=1
pm,zf
(m−z)
+
((
A(t)−B(t)x
)
p¯m +mβ
)
(Kex −K)+ = 0,
(43)
where L˜ is defined in (13). The terminal condition is f (m)(T, x) = m(Kex − K)+, for x ∈
[−xmax, xmax].
Using (42) and the property of Fourier transform that F [xf ](t, ω) = i∂ωF [f ](t, ω), we trans-
form PDE (43) into
∂
∂t
F [f (m)](t, ω) + iB(t)
∂
∂ω
F [f (m)](t, ω) − h(t, ω)F [f (m)](t, ω) + ψ(m)(t, ω) = 0, (44)
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where
h(t, ω) = −(r − q −
σ2
2
)iω +
σ2ω2
2
+ r +A(t) + β, (45)
ψ(m)(t, ω) =
m−1∑
z=1
pm,zF [λf
(m−z)](t, ω) + F [(λp¯m +mβ) (Ke
x −K)+](t, ω), (46)
for (t, ω) ∈ [tv, T )× R.
Observe that (44) is a first-order PDE with terminal condition that F [f (m)](T, ω) = mϕ(ω)
(see (18)). Therefore, we apply the method of characteristics and get
F [f (m)](t, ω)
= e−
∫
T
t
h
(
s,ω−i
∫
t
s
B(u)du
)
dsF [f (m)]
(
T, ω + i
∫ T
t
B(u)du
)
+
∫ T
t
g(m)(τ, ω; t)dτ. (47)
where
g(m)(τ, ω; t) = e−
∫
τ
t
h
(
s,ω−i
∫
t
s
B(u)du
)
dsψ(m)
(
τ, ω + i
∫ τ
t
B(u)du
)
. (48)
For numerical implementation, we can use the similar method mentioned in Section 3.1. We
can make the approximation∫ T
t
g(m)(τ, ω; t)dτ ≈
(
1
2
g(m)(t, ω; t) +
1
2
g(m)(T, ω; t) +
i=N−1∑
i=1
g(m)(t+ iδt, ω; t)
)
δt, (49)
where δt = (T − t)/N . The integral
∫
B(u)du in (47) and (48) can be approximated similarly
or computed explicitly depending on the choice of B(t).
Table 2 presents the ESO costs in the cases of constant exercise intensity λ = 0.2 and
stochastic intensity with λ(s) = 0.2 − 0.02 log(s/K) under different vesting periods and job
termination rates. The stochastic intensity specified here can be larger or smaller than the
constant level 0.2 depending on whether the current stock price s is higher or lower than the
strike price K. For each case, we compute the ESO cost using both FFT and FDM. For the
latter, we apply the Crank-Nicolson method on a uniform grid and adopt Neumann condition
at the boundary s = S∗ (see Section 3.2). As we can see, the costs from the two methods are
practically the same. As the vesting period lengthens, from tv = 1 to tv = 4, the ESO cost
tends to increase under different exercise intensities and job termination rates. When the job
termination rate β is zero, the ESO costs with stochastic intensity appear to be higher, but this
effect is greatly reduced as the job termination rate increases. This is intuitive since a high job
termination rate means that most ESOs will be exercised or forfeited at the departure time,
rather than exercised according to an exercise process over the life of the options.
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Parameters
tv = 1 tv = 2 tv = 4
FDM FFT FDM FFT FDM FFT
λ = 0.2
β = 0
α = 0 12.8052 12.8065 13.7122 13.7134 15.0953 15.0967
α = 0.1 11.5867 11.5878 11.2266 11.2276 10.1187 10.1196
β = 0.5
α = 0 7.8849 7.8859 9.6380 9.6388 12.4022 12.4029
α = 0.1 7.1347 7.1355 7.8910 7.8916 8.3135 8.3139
λ(s) = 0.2 − 0.02 ∗ log(s/K)
β = 0
α = 0 12.8310 12.8379 13.7364 13.7445 15.1130 15.1235
α = 0.1 11.6099 11.6163 11.2464 11.2531 10.1305 10.1376
β = 0.5
α = 0 7.8895 7.8887 9.6428 9.6423 12.4068 12.4076
α = 0.1 7.1387 7.1381 7.8948 7.8946 8.3165 8.3172
Table 2: ESO costs with constant intensity λ and stochastic exercise intensity λ(s) with differ-
ent job termination rates α and β and vesting period tv, computed using FFT and FDM for
comparison. Common parameters: S0 = K = 10, r = 5%, q = 1.5%, σ = 20%, pm,z = 1/m,
M = 5, T = 10. In FDM: S∗ = 30, δS = 0.1, δt = 0.1. In FFT: Nx = 2
12, Xmin = −10 and
Xmax = 10.
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5 Maturity Randomization
In this section, we propose an alternative method to value ESOs. It is an analytical method that
yields an approximation to the original ESO valuation problem discussed in Section 2.3. The
core idea of this method is to randomize the ESO’s finite maturity by an exponential random
variable τ ∼ exp(κ), with κ = 1/T where T here is original constant maturity. Such a choice
of parameter means that IE[τ ] = T ; that is, the ESO is expected to expire at time T . For
instance, if the maturity of the ESOs is 10 years, then the randomized maturity is modeled by
τ ∼ exp(0.1). Such a maturity randomization allows us to derive an explicit approximation for
ESO cost.
5.1 Vested ESO
First we consider the ESO cost at the end of the vesting period. Provided that the employee
remains at the firm by time tv, the vested ESO has a remaining maturity of length T − tv.
Therefore, for the exponentially distributed maturity τ ∼ exp(κ), one may set κ = 1/(T − tv).
At time tv, the vested ESO cost function C
(m)(s) is given by
C(m)(s) =IE
{∫ τ∧ξ
tv
e−r(u−tv)(Su −K)
+dLu
+ e−r(τ∧ξ−tv)(M − Lτ∧ξ)(Sτ∧ξ −K)
+ |Stv = s, Ltv =M −m, τ ∧ ξ ≥ tv
}
(50)
=IE
{∫ ∞
tv
e−(r+κ+β)(u−tv)(Su −K)
+dLu
+
∫ ∞
tv
(κ+ β)e−(r+κ+β)(u−tv)(M − Lu)(Su −K)
+du |Stv = s, Ltv =M −m
}
(51)
=IE
{∫ ∞
0
e−(r+κ+β)u(Su −K)
+dLu
+
∫ ∞
0
(κ+ β)e−(r+κ+β)u(M − Lu)(Su −K)
+du |S0 = s, L0 =M −m
}
, (52)
for m = 1, . . . ,M . From (52), we derive the associated ODE for C(m)(s). For the convenience,
we denote
a0 = −(r + λ+ β + κ), a1 = r − q, a2 =
σ2
2
, gm = λp¯m +m(β + κ). (53)
Then, we obtain a system of second-order linear ODEs:
a0C
(m) + a1s
d
ds
C(m) + a2s
2 d
2
ds2
C(m) + λ
m−1∑
z=1
pm,zC
(m−z) + gm(s−K)
+ = 0, (54)
for m = 1, . . . ,M , and s ∈ R+, with the boundary condition C
(m)(0) = 0.
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Proposition 4 The solution to the ODE system (54) is
C(m)(s) =

Ams+BmK +
m−1∑
n=0
Em,n[ln(
s
K
)]n(
s
K
)γ−θ; if s > K,
m−1∑
n=0
Fm,n[ln(
s
K
)]n(
s
K
)γ+θ; if 0 ≤ s ≤ K,
(55)
for m = 1, . . . ,M , where
Am =
1
a1 + a0
(
−λ
m−1∑
z=1
pm,zAm−z − gm
)
,
Bm =
1
a0
(
−λ
m−1∑
z=1
pm,zBm−z + gm
)
,
E1,0 = −
(A1 +B1)K(γ + θ)−A1K
2θ
,
F1,0 = −
(A1 +B1)K(γ − θ)−A1K
2θ
,
Em,m−1 = −
λpm,1Em−1,m−2
(m− 1)[a1 + 2a2(γ − θ)− a2]
, for m ≥ 2,
Fm,m−1 = −
λpm,1Fm−1,m−2
(m− 1)[a1 + 2a2(γ + θ)− a2]
, for m ≥ 2,
Em,n = −
λ
∑m−n
z=1 pm,zEm−z,n−1 + (n+ 1)na2Em,n+1
n[a1 + 2a2(γ − θ)− a2]
, for 1 ≤ n ≤ m− 2,
Fm,n = −
λ
∑m−n
z=1 pm,zFm−z,n−1 + (n+ 1)na2Fm,n+1
n[a1 + 2a2(γ + θ)− a2]
, for 1 ≤ n ≤ m− 2,
Em,0 = −
(Am +Bm)K(γ + θ)−AmK + Fm,1 −Em,1
2θ
, for m ≥ 2,
Fm,0 = −
(Am +Bm)K(γ − θ)−AmK + Fm,1 −Em,1
2θ
, for m ≥ 2,
(56)
and
γ =
1
2
−
r − q
σ2
, θ =
√
γ2 +
2(r + λ+ β + κ)
σ2
. (57)
Proof. We begin by considering the case that the employee only holds a single option. With
M = 1, the general solution to ODE (54) is given by
C(1)(s) =
A1s+B1K +E1,0(
s
K
)γ−θ + E˜1,0(
s
K
)γ+θ; if s > K,
F1,0(
s
K
)γ+θ + F˜1,0(
s
K
)γ−θ; if 0 ≤ s ≤ K,
(58)
where
A1 = −
g1
a1 + a0
, B1 =
g1
a0
. (59)
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By imposing that C(1)(s) and ddsC
(1)(s) to be continuous at the strike price K, we consider
C(1)(s) at s = K and obtain[
1 1
γ − θ γ + θ
] [
E1,0 − F˜1,0
E˜1,0 − F1,0
]
= −K
[
A1 +B1
A1
]
(60)
⇒
[
E1,0 − F˜1,0
E˜1,0 − F1,0
]
= −
K
2θ
[
(γ + θ)(A1 +B1)−A1
−(γ − θ)(A1 +B1) +A1
]
. (61)
In addition, since γ − θ < 0, we will have F˜1,0 = 0 to guarantee that C
(1)(0) = 0. And, when
κ→∞, the maturity τ → 0, P-a.s., which will lead to C(1)(s)→ (s−K)+. Therefore, we have
E˜1,0 = 0. As a result, we obtain the remaining non-zero coefficients:[
E1,0
F1,0
]
= −
K
2θ
[
(γ + θ)(A1 +B1)−A1
(γ − θ)(A1 +B1)−A1
]
. (62)
For M ≥ 2, the general solution to ODE (54) is
C(m)(s) =

Ams+BmK +
m−1∑
n=0
Em,n[ln(
s
K
)]n(
s
K
)γ−θ if s > K,
m−1∑
n=0
Fm,n[ln(
s
K
)]n(
s
K
)γ+θ if 0 ≤ s ≤ K.
(63)
Applying ODE (54), we obtain the relationship between the coefficients of C(m)(s) and the
coefficients of C(n)(s), for n ≤ m− 1, as follows:
Am =
1
a1 + a0
(
−λ
m−1∑
z=1
pm,zAm−z − gm
)
,
Bm =
1
a0
(
−λ
m−1∑
z=1
pm,zBm−z + gm
)
,
Em,m−1 = −
λpm,1Em−1,m−2
(m− 1)[a1 + 2a2(γ − θ)− a2]
,
Fm,m−1 = −
λpm,1Fm−1,m−2
(m− 1)[a1 + 2a2(γ + θ)− a2]
,
Em,n = −
λ
∑m−n
z=1 pm,zEm−z,n−1 + (n+ 1)na2Em,n+1
n[a1 + 2a2(γ − θ)− a2]
, for 1 ≤ n ≤ m− 2,
Fm,n = −
λ
∑m−n
z=1 pm,zFm−z,n−1 + (n+ 1)na2Fm,n+1
n[a1 + 2a2(γ + θ)− a2]
, for 1 ≤ n ≤ m− 2,
(64)
for m = 2, . . . ,M .
In addition, the continuity of C(m)(s) and ddsC
(m)(s) around strike price K yields that
(Am +Bm)K + Em,0 = Fm,0,
Am + (γ − θ)
Em,0
K
+
Em,1
K
= (γ + θ)
Fm,0
K
+
Fm,1
K
.
(65)
20
Rearranging, we obtain the remaining coefficients for the solution:
Em,0 = −
(Am +Bm)K(γ + θ)−AmK + Fm,1 − Em,1
2θ
,
Fm,0 = −
(Am +Bm)K(γ − θ)−AmK + Fm,1 − Em,1
2θ
.
(66)
5.2 Unvested ESO
For the unvested ESO, we can model the vesting time tv by the exponential random variable
τv ∼ exp(κ˜), where κ˜ = 1/tv. Then, the unvested ESO cost at time 0 is given by
C˜(m)(s) = IE
{
e−(r+α)τvC(m)(Sτv )
∣∣∣∣S0 = s} (67)
= IE
{∫ ∞
0
κ˜e−(r+α+κ˜)uC(m)(Su)du
∣∣∣∣S0 = s}. (68)
Then we will can derive the ODE for C˜(m)(s):
−(r + α+ κ˜)C˜(m) + (r − q)s
d
ds
C˜(m) +
σ2s2
2
d2
ds2
C˜(m) + κ˜C(m) = 0 for s ∈ R+,
C˜(m)(0) = 0.
(69)
Assuming λ+ β + κ 6= α + κ˜, we could derive the solution for C˜(m) from the solution for C(m)
in (63), which is
C˜(m)(s) =

A˜ms+ B˜mK +
m−1∑
n=0
E˜m,n[ln(
s
K
)]n(
s
K
)γ−θ + E˜m(
s
K
)γ˜−θ˜ if s > K,
m−1∑
n=0
F˜m,n[ln(
s
K
)]n(
s
K
)γ+θ + F˜m(
s
K
)γ˜+θ˜ if 0 ≤ s ≤ K,
(70)
where 
γ˜ = γ =
1
2
−
r − q
σ2
,
θ˜ =
√
γ˜2 +
2(r + α+ κ˜)
σ2
,
A˜m =
κ˜Am
q + α+ κ˜
,
B˜m =
κ˜Bm
r + α+ κ˜
,
(71)
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and
E˜m,m−1 = −
κ˜Em,m−1
R
,
F˜m,m−1 = −
κ˜Fm,m−1
R
,
E˜m,m−2 = −
κ˜Em,m−2 + (m− 1)P1E˜m,m−1
R
,
F˜m,m−2 = −
κ˜Fm,m−2 + (m− 1)Q1F˜m,m−1
R
,
E˜m,n = −
2κ˜Em,n + 2(n + 1)P1E˜m,n+1 + σ
2(n+ 2)(n+ 1)E˜m,n+2
2R
for 0 ≤ n ≤ m− 3,
F˜m,n = −
2κ˜Fm,n + 2(n+ 1)Q1F˜m,n+1 + σ
2(n+ 2)(n + 1)F˜m,n+2
2R
for 0 ≤ n ≤ m− 3,
E˜m =
(γ˜ + θ˜)P −Q
2θ˜
,
F˜m =
(γ˜ − θ˜)P −Q
2θ˜
,
(72)
with 
R = λ+ β + κ− α− κ˜,
P1 = r − q +
σ2(2γ − 2θ − 1)
2
,
Q1 = r − q +
σ2(2γ + 2θ − 1)
2
,
P = F˜m,0 − E˜m,0 −KA˜m −KB˜m,
Q = (γ + θ)F˜m,0 − (γ − θ)E˜m,0 −KA˜m + F˜m,1 − E˜m,1.
(73)
Alternatively, one can use FDM or FFT to calculate the unvested ESO cost without applying
maturity randomization for the second time.
In Figure 6, we show the cost of an unvested ESO, computed by our maturity randomization
method, as a function of the initial stock price S0, along with the ESO payoff. As expected, the
ESO cost is increasing convex in S0. Comparing the costs corresponding to two different job
termination rates α ∈ {0.01, 0.1} during the vesting period, we see that a higher job termination
rate reduces the ESO value. This is intuitive as the employee has a higher chance of leaving the
firm during the vesting period and in turn losing the option entirely.
The maturity randomization method delivers an analytical approximation that allows for
instant computation. In Figure 7, we examine errors of this method. As we can see, as the
exercise intensity λ or post vesting job termination rate β increases the valuation error decreases
exponentially to less than a penny for each option. This shows that the maturity randomization
method can be very accurate and effective for ESO valuation.
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Figure 6: The ESO cost computed using the maturity randomization method, and plotted as
a function of stock price S0 with two different job termination rates α = 0.01, 0.1, along with
the ESO payoff function (S0 − K)
+ for comparison. Parameters: T = 10, tv = 2, κ = 0.125,
κ˜ = 0.5, r = 5%, q = 1.5%, σ = 20%, λ = 0.1 and β = 0.1.
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Figure 7: Plots of the errors of maturity randomization method as a function of exercise intensity
λ and job termination rate β respectively in (a) and (b). We fix β = 1 in (a) and λ = 1 in
(b). Parameters: S0 = K = 10, T = 10, tv = 0, κ = 0.1, κ˜ = 0, r = 5%, q = 1.5%, σ = 20%,
pm,z = 1/m and M = 5. Common parameters: λ = 1 and β = 1.
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6 Conclusion
We have studied a new valuation framework that allows the ESO holder to spread out the ex-
ercises of different quantities over time, rather than assuming that all options will be exercised
at the same time. The holder’s multiple random exercises are modeled by an exogenous jump
process. We illustrate the distribution of multiple-date exercises that are consistent with empir-
ical evidence. Additional features included are job termination risk during and after the vesting
period. For cost computation, we apply a fast Fourier transform method and finite difference
method to solve the associated systems of PDEs. Moreover, we provide an alternative method
based on maturity randomization for approximating the ESO cost. Its analytic formulae for
vested and unvested ESO costs allow for instant computation. The proposed numerical method
is not only applicable to expensing ESO grants as required by regulators, but also useful for
understanding the combined effects of exercise intensity and job termination risk on the ESO
cost. For future research, there are a number of directions related to our proposed framework.
For many companies, risk estimation for large ESO pool is both practically important and chal-
lenging. Another related issue concerns the incentive effect and optimal design of ESOs so that
the firm can better align the employee’s interest over a longer period of time.
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